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THE ECONO.MIC V.\LUE OF TRUST
IN SUPPLIER-BUYER RELATIONS
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the relationship between supplier trust in the buyer and transaction
costs, information sharing, and re[ation-specific investments in a sample of 453 supplier-
automaker exchange relationships in the U. S., Japan, and Korea. Our findings indicate that trust
reduces transaction costs and increases information sharing in supplier-buyer relationships.
lMoreover, the findings suggest that the economic value created for transactors, in terms of Io\ver
transaction costs, may be substantial. [n particular, we found that the automaker with the least
trusting supplier relations spent twice as much of its face-to-face interaction time \vith suppliers
on ex ante contracting and ex post haggling when compared to the most trusted automakers.
This translated into procurement (transaction) costs which were as much as five times higher for
the least trusted automaker compared to the most trusted automaker. Finally, we argue that trust
is unique as a governance mechanism because it not only minimizes transaction costs, but also
has a mutually causal relationship with other behaviors (i.e. information sharing. buyer technical
assistance) that create value in the exchange relationship. Other governance mechanisms (e.g..
contracts. financial hostages) are necessary costs incurred to prevent opportunistic behavior but
do not create value beyond transaction cost minimization. Thus, our findings indicate that trust
in supplier-buyer relations can create economic value and may be an important source of
competitive advantage.
The issue of trust in economic exchanges has recently received considerable attention in
the academic literature (Sake, 199 1; Williamson. 1993; Barney & Hansen, 1995; Mayer, et al
1995’) as well as the popular press (Business Week. 1986.1992: Economist. 1996; Fukuyama.
1995). Trust in exchange relationships has been hypothesized to be a valuable economic asset
because it has been described as an important antecedent to effective interorganizational
collaboration (Sake. 199 1; Smith, Carroll, and Ashford. 1995). Nlore specifically, trust is
believed to: (1) lower transaction costs and allow for greater flexibility to respond to changing
market conditions (Dore, 1983; Sake, 1991: Gulati. 1995; Barney & Hansen. 1995; Dyer, 1997).
(2) lead [o superior information sharing rou[ines \vhich improve coordination and joint efforts to
minimize inefficiencies (Aoki. 1988; Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Nishiguchi. 1994) , and (3)
facilitate investments in transaction or rela[ion-specl>c assets’ which enhance productivity
(Asanuma, 1989: Lorenz, 1988: Dyer. 1996a). Some scholars even claim that national economic
efficiency is highly correlated with the existence of a high trust institutional environment (North.
1990; Casson, 1991; Hill, 1995; Fukuyama, 1995). For example, Fukuyama (1995:7) argues that
the economic success of a nation, “as well as its ability to compete, is conditioned by . . . the
level of trust inherent in the society. ” Indeed, numerous scholars have suggested that
interorganizational trust is a key factor in explaining the competitive advantage of Japanese firms
relative to U.S. or U.K. firms (Dore. 1983; Smitka. 1991; Sake, 1991: Dyer, 1996b). The
findings from these, and
in economic exchanges.
other, studies have increased our attention on the important role of trust
1 We use the terms transaction and relation-specific investments interchangeably, though we typically use
the term “relation-specific” assets to suggest a shift in attention from the transaction to the economic
relationship as the unit of analysis (see Kogut, 1989; Powell, 1990).
But does trust really pay off in hard economic benefits. or does this feel-good approach to
economic exchange relationships bring only marginal benefits? Aithough the theoretical
literature on the potential economic value of trust is ~vell developed. empirical research is
lacking. In fact. with the exception of some anecdotal. case study evidence (Dore. 1983: Lorenz.
1988: Sake. 199 1; Fukuyama, 1995; Dyer. 1996b) there have been t’ew. if any. large sample
empirical studies on the relationship between trust and the various activities believed to create
economic value in exchange relationships. As Zucker ( 1986:59) has observed, “For a concept
that is acknowledged as central, trust has received very little empirical investigation. ” For
example, trust is widely argued to reduce transaction costs in exchange relationships and >et
empirical studies confirming this hypothesis are essentially non-existant. One reason for the lack
of empirical work examining this important topic is that concepts such as “trust” and “transaction
costs” are difficult to operationalize. As Williamson (1985: 105) has acknowledged: “A common
characteristic of these studies [on transaction costs] is that direct measures of transaction costs
are rarely attempted. ”
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between trust and performance in
a sample of supplier-buyer exchange relationships. More specifically, we seek to answer the
following questions: Do suppliers that have developed a high level of trust in a bu]wr (1) incur
Iower transaction costs, (2) share more information, and (3) make greater investments in
reiation-spec(fic assets than suppliers with lower levels of trust. We investigate the relationship
between trust and information sharing, relation-specific investments, and transaction costs in a
sample of 453 supplier-automaker exchange relationships in the U. S., Japan, and Korea. We also
examine the extent to which supplier trust creates measurable economic value for the buyer by
examining whether or not “trustworthy” automakers incur lower procurement (transaction) costs
than ‘-less trustworthy” automakers. In summary. our objective was to empirically examine in a
cross-national setting whether or not trust creates economic vaiue in exchange relationships in
the ways theorized in the academic iiterature.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
Defining Trust
Among organizational scholars, trust has received attention as a mechanism of
organizational control. and more specifically as an alternative to price, contracts. and authority
(Ouchi, 1980; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Powell, 1990). The literature on interorganizationa!
relations offers two general definitions of trust: confidence or predictability in one’s expectations
about another’s behavior, and confidence in another’s good~vill (Ring & Van de Ven. 1992:
Zaheer et al, forthcoming). We draw on the previous literature in defining trust as i)nepwt?”.s
confidence that the other party in the exchange relationship ivill not exploit its ~ulner~[bilities
(Dore, 1983; Sake. 1991; Ring& Van de Van 1992; Sahel. 1993: Barney& Hansen. 1995). This
confidence (trust) would be expected to emerge in situations where the “trust~vorth y“ party in the
exchange relationship: ( 1) is known to reliably make good faith efforts to behave in accordance
with prior commitments, (2) makes adjustments (i.e. as market conditions change) in \vays
perceived as “fair” by the exchange partner, and (3) does not take excessive advantage of an
exchange partner even when the opportunity is available. Thus. our definition characterizes
interfirm trust as a construct based on three components: reliability, fairness, and goodwill. Our
definition of trust is similar to the “goodwill trust” description given by Sako ( 199 1) and the
“trust” definitions offered by numerous scholars (Sahel. 1993; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Barney
& Hansen, 1995). Thus, trust, as defined here, is not based upon contracts or third party
sanctions but rather is based on non-contractual mechanisms.
Conceptually, organizations are not able to trust each other; trust has its basis in
individuals. Trust can be placed by one individual in another individual or in a group of
individuals. such as a partner organization. Howe\er, individuals in an organization may share
an orientation toward individuals within another organization. From this perspective,
‘-interorganizational trust describes the extent to which there is a collectively-held trust
orientation by organizational members toward the partner firm” (Zaheer, MCEvil y & Perrone
forthcoming)
In this study we consider trust (this collective orientation) by an automotive supplier in its
automaker customer. This research setting was an unusually good test site because it was
important to study a set of transaction relationships in which trust might be important and
valuable. Many scholars have argued that risk, or having something invested, is requisite to
trust. The need for trust only arises in a risky situation (Deutsch. 1958; Mayer et al, i 995). The
automobile is a complex product with thousands of components that must work together as a
system. Components are often tailored to specific models and as a result suppliers must make
automaker-specific investments @Jishiguchi. 1994; Dyer, 1996a). Since these investments are
not easily re-deployable, suppliers are at risk if automakers choose to behave opportunistically.
Furthermore, the auto industry is characterized by a high degree of market uncertainty (Pine,
1993 ), which increases both the risks associated with transacting as well as the importance of
information shaning (Lorenz, 1988; Aoki, 1988). Thus, a supplier’s trust in the automaker is of
particular importance in the auto industry due to supplier investments in customer-specific assets
and market uncertainty which places suppliers in a vulnerable position.
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Trust and Economic Performance
Trust is generally considered to be of most economic value when it is based on non-
contractual, rather than contractual mechanisms. The rationale for the economic value of “non-
contractual” trust is straightforward: trust eliminates the need for formal contracts. \vhich are
costly to write, monitor, and enforce (Hill. 1995; Barney & Hansen. 1995). Thus. trust is
believed to reduce transaction costs. Furthermore, some anecdotal evidence suggests that
transactors are more likely to share valuable work-related information when they have de~eloped
a high level of trust (Lorenz, 1988; Sake, 1991; Nishiguchi. 1994). Finally, high levels of
interorganizational trust may prompt firms to make investments in productive relation-specific
assets or technologies that are tailored to the exchange relationship. We examine each of these
proposed relationships in greater detail.
Trust and Transaction Costs
Transaction costs can be decomposed into four separate costs related to transacting: 1)
search costs, 2) contracting costs, 3) monitoring costs, and 4) enforcement costs (Williamson.
1985; Hennart, 1993; North, 1990). Search costs include the costs of gathering information to
identify and evaluate potential trading partners. Contracting COSISrefer to the costs associated
with negotiating and writing an agreement. .Moniforing costs refer to the costs associated with
monitoring the agreement to ensure that each party fulfills the predetermined set of obligations.
Enforcement costs refer to the costs associated with ex post haggling and sanctioning a trading
partner that does not perform according to the predetermined agreement.
Trust may reduce the transaction costs incurred by exchange partners in three ways.
First, under conditions of high trust transactors will spend less time on ex ante contracting
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#because they trust that payoffs will be fairly divided. As a result, they do not have to plan for all
future contingencies because they are confident that equitable adjustments will be made as
market conditions change. Thus, trust allows transactors to achieve “serial equity”
(equity/reciprocity over a longer period of time) rather than requiring immediate or “spot equity”
(Ouchi, 1984: Dyer. 1997). Consequently. it reduces the need for transactors to invest heavily in
ex ante bargaining.
Second, under conditions of high trust, trading partners will spend less time and resources
on monitoring to see if the other party is shirking or fulfilling the “spirit” of the agreement. If
each exchange partner is confident that the other party will not take advantage even if it has the
chance, then both parties can devote fewer resources to monitoring. Finally, trust may reduce
transaction costs by reducing the amount of time and resources that transactors spend on ex post
bargaining and haggling over problems that arise in the course of transacting. If trust is high then
each party will assume that the other party is acting in good faith and will interpret behaviors
more positively (Uzzi. 1993). Consequently, trading partners will spend less time haggling over
problems that have emerged during the course of transacting due to mutual confidence that
inequities will be fairly addressed and remedied.
Hypothesis I: The greater the s~ipplier trust in the bu,ver, the 10wer the transaction costs
incurred by the exchange partners.
Trust and Information Sharing
We theorize a positive relationship between supplier trust and information sharing for two
primary reasons. First, if the supplier can trust the buyer not to behave opportunistically, it w-ill
be more willing to share confidential information, such as on production costs or on product
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design and process innovations. However. a supplier will voluntarily share this information only
if it trusts the buyer not to steal its ideas and/or share them with competitors (i.e. with in-house
supplier divisions or other external supplier competitors) or will not attempt to ““squeeze-- the
supplier’s profit margins. In the absence of trust. information sharing on costs or new ideas/
technologies is unlikely because this information COU,Jbe “poached” or used opportunistically
(Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1993).
Second, a lack of trust may cause exchange partners to suppress potentially relevant
information that would be useful for problem solving. For example. suppliers may be un~tilling
to share information on production or design problems if they do not trust the buyer to i~ot-k
cooperatively in joint problem-solving. In particular, suppliers may be reluctant to share any
information that exposes weaknesses in their operations or their cost structure, even though the
sharing of such information could result in valuable suggestions from the buyer that couid lead to
effective solutions. In contrast. high trust may lead to the mechanisms associated with “voice”
(i.e. direct feedback, joint problem solving) [Helper. 1991; Nishiguchi. 1994) rather than exit
(termination of the relationship).
H>po[hesis 2: The greater the supplier trust in the hu>’er.the more the supplier ~~illshare
valuable (conjidentia[) }vork-related information with the buyer.
Trust and investments in Relation-Spec[jic Assets
Recent studies indicate that investments in relation-specific investments can enhance
productivity in exchange relationships (Asanuma, 1989; Parkhe, 1993; Dyer, 1996a). Ho\ve\er.
investments in relation-specific assets create appropriable quasi-rents which in turn creates the
potential for opportunism (Klein. Crawford & .Alchian, 1978). Thus, in order for trading partners
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(i.e. suppliers) to willingly make investments in relation-specific assets, they must have
assurances that the other party will not behave opportunistically and attempt to appropriate those
quasi-rents. This is a real concern for suppliers as demonstrated by the empirical findings from
recent studies (Lyons, 1994; Dyer, 1997). For example, Lyons ( 1994) found that 60 percent of
U.K. transactors in a particular engineering field claimed that they were nol utilizing the optimal
level of specialized investments with their main customer. Lyons suggests that these suppliers
did not make the optimal level of investments because they were unwilling to expose themselves
to the risk of being opportunistically exploited. In the absence of trust, suppliers will be less
likely to make investments in productivity-enhancing assets that are tailored to a particular
customer.
Hypothesis 3: The greater the supplier trlist in the buyer, the greater the supplier !s invesonent in
relation-specl$c assets which are tailored/dedicated to the buyer.
Information Sharing and Transaction Costs
When trading partners share information they reduce information asymmetry as well as
the potential for opportunism. This in turn should reduce transaction costs in the exchange
relationship. In neoclassical economics, transaction costs are assumed to be zero because
transactors have perfect information. Information asymmetry is necessary in order for
transactors to behave opportunistically y. AS North (1990: 108) observes, “the costs of transacting
arise because information is costly” and “asymmetrically held by the parties to the exchange. ” In
a transaction world of perfect information, transaction costs should be negligible because
transactors cannot behave opportunistically by concealing relevant information (Akerlof, 1970;
North, 1990). Thus, a high degree of supplier-buyer information sharing would be expected to
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have an inverse relationship with transaction costs.
Hypothesis 4: The greater the !evei of supplier information sharing, the lower the transaction
costs incurred in the exchange relationship.
Relation-Specijic [investments and Transclc[ion C’OSIS
Previous research has shown that productivity gains in the value chain are possible w-hen
firms are willing to make relation-specific investments (Williamson, 1985; Asanuma. 1989:
Parkhe, 1993; Dyer, 1996a). However, increased specialization within a production network
cannot be achieved without a cost. When transactors make investments in specialization,
transaction costs arise because of the fear of opportunism. A central premise of transaction cost
theory is that transaction costs increase as transactors make greater relation-specific investments.
The standard reasoning is that as asset specificity increases, more complex governance structures
(e.g., more complex contracts) are required to eliminate or attenuate costly bargaining over
profits from specialized assets (Williamson. 1985). Thus, transaction costs are presumed to
increase with an increase in asset specificityy.
Hypothesis 5: The greater the supplier h investment in reiation-speci$c investments, the higher
the transaction costs incurred in the exchange relationship.
Suppiier Information Sharing and Buyer Technical Assistance
The willingness of a buyer to commit resources to help suppliers solve problems and
improve their operations may be contingent on the supplier’s willingness to share information
(Nishiguchi, 1994; Helper, Pil, & MacDuffie, 1997). For example, the international purchasing
chief for Toyota made the following statement with regard to his firm’s inability to work
effectively with some U.S. suppliers,
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Many U.S. suppliers do not understand our lvay of doing business. They do not want us
to visit their plants and they are unwilling to share the information we require, This
makes it very difficult for us to work with them effectively; we also can’t help them to
improve (Author interview, July 22. 1992).
In this particular case, the willingness of the supplier to share information influenced the buyer’s
commitment of resources to assist the supplier improle its operations. Nloreover. the ability of
exchange partners to effectively diagnose problems and jointly problem solve is based in large
part on the willingness of the parties to share accurate, and sometimes confidential, information,
Consequently, the supplier may have to share information in order to call forth the resources of
the buyer for joint problem solving, Thus. we \vould expect a positive relationship between
supplier information sharing and buyer technical assistance.
Hypothesis 6: The greater the level ofslipplier injormc~tion shuring, ihe greater the technical
assistance oflered by the buyer,
See Figure 1 for a summary of the hypothesized relationships. We acknowledge that the
direction of causality between trust and information sharing. and bet~veen buyer assistance and
information sharing, is open to debate. For example, one can argue that information sharing
leads to high trust rather than vice versa. We would expect some degree of reciprocal causality
with these variables where trust both influences, and is influenced by, information sharing.
However, we have operationalized information sharing as the extent to which the supplier shares
proprietary and confidential information with the buyer--information that would be unlikely to be
shared without some degree of trust. Of course, after this information is shared (and the other
party behaves in a trustworthy manner) this would further increase trust. We explore the issue of
reciprocal causality in greater detail in the discussion section.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Sample and Data Collection
We chose a cross national setting to test our hypotheses for the following reasons. First.
Japan has been described as a high trust environment ~vhere interfirm trust is a key factor that
facilitates exchange and creates competitive advantages for Japanese firms (Dore. 1983; Sake.
199 1; Hill, 1995). Thus, we wanted to empirical] y examine the extent to \vhich intertl-m trust is
correlated with value-creating behaviors (e. g.. information sharing, low transaction costs. etc. ) in
Japan. In contrast, the United States has often been characterized as a low trust environment
relative to Japan (Dore, 1983; Sake. 1991; Shane. 1994). However. Fukuyama (1995) has
recently argued that the United States, like Japan, is a high trust environment--particularly \vhen
it is compared to other less developed countries. Our data allow us to examine whether levels of
trust are reported as the same or different. and \vhether the relationship between trust and
performance outcomes holds in both the U.S. and Japan. Finally, Korea was added because
Korea’s culture is similar to Japan’s, and yet management practices in Korea have been
influenced by U.S. firms, particularly in the auto industry where long-standing partner
relationships have been formed between Daewoo and General motors (GM owned 50 percent of
Daewoo until 1994) and Kia and Ford. We were curious to see whether or not interiirm trust
levels were similar to Japan’s (perhaps due to cultural similarities) or more similar to the U.S.
(perhaps due to similar management practices). Further, adding Korea allowed us to test whether
or not the relationship between trust and performance outcomes was robust across numerous
institutional environments.
The sample consisted of three U.S. (General Motors, Ford, Chrysler), two Japanese
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(Toyota. Nissan), and three Korean (Hyundai, Daewoo, Kia) automakers and a sample of their
suppliers. The authors visited each company’s purchasing department and asked the department
manager to select a representative sample of suppliers. ~~hich included both partners (i.e.
keiretsu/chaebol suppliers) and non-partner (i.e. independent) suppliers. We intemiewed a total
of31 purchasing executives at the eight automakers’ purchasing departments to obtain feedback
on the appropriateness. completeness, and clarity of the questionnaire, and to gain a better
understanding of the issues arising in automaker-supplier relations.
We also interviewed sales and engineering vice-presidents at 70 suppliers (30 U. S.. 20
Japanese, 20 Korean), during which the survey was pretested. The survey was translated (and
back translated) into Japanese and Korean by a team of Korean and Japanese Ph.D. and MBA
students at a major U.S. business school. some of whom had worked in the automotive industry.
The language of the survey was reiined during inte~ie~vs at both the automakers and suppliers.
lMost importantly, the interviews helped us to gain a better understanding of the industry and the
nature of the supplier-automaker relationship. To minimize key-informant bias and follow the
general recommendation to use the most knowledgeable informant (Kumar et al, 1993), we asked
the purchasing managers at each automaker to identify the supplier executive w-ho was most
responsible for managing the day-to-day relationship. This person was typically the supplier’s
sales vice-president, sales account manager. or in some cases. the president. The final survey
was then sent to the key supplier informant identified by the automaker.
One may question whether a single informant has sufficient knowledge and ability to
assess the collective trust orientation of individuals at her organization towards the automaker
organization. Although responses from multiple informants would have been preferred (with a
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cost of a smaller sample), we believe that our informants were well positioned to make this $
assessment for the following reasons. First. key informants had been employed at their
respective organizations for an average of 16 years and thus had a long history of \vorking with
the automaker. These individuals had prima~ responsibility for managing the day-to-day
relationship with the customer and were well a~vare of’the variety of interactions bet~~een their.
and their customer’s, employees. Further, in approximatel~ 15 of our in-person intewiews \tith
suppliers, the key informants brought 2-3 other top supplier executives to the inter~ieit- (e.g.. \ice
president of engineering, key sales representatives) }vho had pre~iously filled out our
questionnaire separately from the key informant. During the intewiew, the group of supplier
executives would look at each other’s answers and come to a consensus on the “group” ans~ter
(we were able to see their individual responses). The degree of similarity in their responses was
remarkable; rarely did the responses vary more than one point on a seven point Likert scale. In
the rare case where there was some discussion about the ‘right’. group answtr, the key informant
typically brought more information to the discussion than the other members. Consequently. ~~-e
believe the key informant responses to reliably represent the responses we would have received
had we surveyed multiple individuals at the supplier.
Usable responses were obtained from 135 U.S. (,66V0response rate). 101 Japanese (68°/0
response rate) and 217 Korean (5 5°/0 response rate) suppliers. The data collection was done
between 1992 and 1994. The U.S. and Japanese data were collected in 1992, reflecting data for
1991, and the Korean data were collected in 1994, reflecting data for 1993. We do not belie~e
this will bias the results since Korean suppliers indicated that their relationship
automaker customer had not changed in any significant ways since 1992.
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with their largest
Operational lMeasures
Recall that the survey was administered to the suppliers. Therefore, the measures reflect
the perceptions of suppliers regarding the supplier-automaker relationship. Ho wever, during our
interviews with the purchasing managers of the automakers \ve discovered that both the supplier
and automaker perceptions regarding the relationship \vere very similar in specific cases we
discussed. There were no instances \vhere the perceptions of suppliers and automakers ~vere
dramatically different. Our anecdotal findings are similar to those of Anderson and Narus ( 1990)
who found that suppliers’ and buyers’ perceptions of levels of trust were quite consistent.
Trust
Consistent with previous studies we operationalized trust using multiple scale items
designed to measure the extent to which the supplier trusted the automaker not to behave
opportunistically (Anderson & Narus. 1990: Heide & John, 1988; Zaheer & Venkatraman. 1995).
Trust (TRUST) was operationalized as the sum of the following submeasures.
1. The extent to which the supplier trusts the manufacturer to treat the supplier fairly.
2. The extent to which the automaker has a reputation for trustworthiness (following through on
promises and commitments) in the general supplier community.
3. If given the chance, the extent to which the supplier perceives that the automaker will take
unfair advantage of the supplier (reverse scored).
Our trust construct includes key elements of our definition of trust, including fairness, reliability,
and goodwill (a willingness to forego opportunistic behavior even when the chance is available).
Each scale item was measured on a 7-point Likert scale ( 1=Not at all, 7=T0 a very great extent).
The Chronbach alpha for this construct was .84. indicating high reliability.
Transaction Costs
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To measure transaction costs, we asked suppliers to estimate how much of their
face-to-face communication time with automakers involved negotiating a price or contact. or
assigning blame for problems. Thus, transaction costs were measured as the sum of the
follo~ving t~vo submeasures:
1<
is
‘)A.
is
The percent of face-to-face communication time. btmveen the automaker and the supplier. that
spent negotiating a price/contract (ex ante contracting) [percent out of 100 percent].
The percent of face-to-face communication time, between the automaker and the supplier. that
spent assigning blame for problems (ex pest haggling) [percent out of 100 percent].
Our construct includes
bargaining/contracting
two key elements of transaction costs, including ex ante
and ex post haggling. Thus. it captures those activities which by
themselves are not value-enhancing activities. but rather are activities associated
the transaction and ensuring that each party lives up to its part of the agreement.
\vith completing
Although these
measures do not capture all of the transaction-related costs incurred by the companies (e.g..
search costs are ignored because these are existing relationships), we believe this measure to be a
reasonable proxy of the key elements of transaction costs.
Information Sharing
Information sharing was operationalized as the extent to which the supplier shares
confidential/proprietary information with automaker buyers and engineers (1-7 Likert scale). In
particular, the sharing of sensitive information, such as costs and proprietary technology, has
been demonstrated to be a critical factor for the successful implementation of automaker and
suppliers’ joint efforts to minimize costs @ishiguchi, 1994). However, the sharing of such
sensitive information is also somewhat risky given the potential for opportunism on the part of
the exchange partner.
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Relation-Specljlc Assets
Relation-specific assets are assets that are uniquely tailored to a particular exchange
relationship and which have low salvage value outside of the relationship. Williamson (1985)
identified site, physical. human. and dedicated assets as four distinct types of transaction-specific
investments. In our study we operationalized relation-specific assets as the sum of two
measures: one designed to measure physical asset specificity and one designed to measure
dedicated asset specificity. We excluded human asset specificity as a measure because of the
belief that investments in human-specific investments (e.g., dedicated personnel) are arguably a
key antecedent to building interorganizational trust. We wanted to focus on investments in
“hard” physical assets, thereby avoiding the potential confounding effects of using human asset
specificity which some may view as even being a proxy of intertirm trust.
Physical Asset Spec/jici~. Physical asset specificit>r refers to capital investments in customized
machinery, tools. dies. etc. Naturally, it is not easy to measure the extent to which a piece of
equipment is customized to a particular customer (unless it is 100 percent specialized). Physicai
asset specificity was operationalized as the percent of the supplier’s total capital equipment
investments which would have to be scrapped if they were prohibited from conducting any future
business with the automaker. This percentage was estimated by supplier respondents. Physical
specificity was assumed to increase with an increase in the percentage of capital investment
which could not be redeployed.
Dedicated Asset Specificity. The supplier’s sales to the automaker divided by the supplier’s total
sales to all customers was employed as a measure of dedicated asset specificity. Suppliers are
assumed to have dedicated and tailored more processes, personnel, plant space, etc. to
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automakers that purchase a large percentage of their total output. Thus, supplier investments in
relation-specific assets are assumed to be higher in cases where they sell a greater percentage of
their total output to a particular automaker.
We standardized the responses of each supplier on the physical and dedicated asset
variables and then summed them to create an overall measure of investments in relation-specific
assets for each supplier. The Chronbach alpha for the relation-specific asset construct was .77.
Buyer Technical Assistance
Buyer technical assistance was operationalized as the sum of the follot~ing t~io sub-
measures:
1. The extent to which the automaker provides assistance to help the supplier improve product
quality (1-7 scale),
2. The extent to which the automaker provides assistance to help the supplier reduce
manufacturing costs ( 1-7 scale).
The suppliers were asked to consider all forms of assistance they received from their autortmker
customer to help them improve quality and costs. The Chronbach alpha for the buyer assistance
construct was .79.
MODEL AND DATA ANALYSIS
The mcdel that was estimated is shown in Figure 1. Note that in Figure 1. we have added
dotted lines to indicate that greater infomnation sharing and buyer technical assistance. greater
investments in relation-specific assets, and lower transaction costs should lead to higher leve 1sof
joint economic performance/efficiency. These relationships are not tested as part of the LISREL
model but are examined n greater detail in the discussion section and are supported by numerous
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previous studies. For example, the important link between transaction costs and economic
performance has been the focus of considerable discussion in the transaction cost literature (see
Williamson, 1985/1 991; Hennart. 1993). We also expect information sharing and relation-
specific investments to lead to greater economic efficiency. The relationship between
information sharing, technical assistance. and performance has been examined in some detail by
numerous scholars (See Aoki, 1988; Nishiguchi. 1994). Similarly. the positive relationship
between relation-specific assets and performance has been explored in great detail by Asanuma
.
(1989) and Dyer (1996a). Although we do not explicitly address these relationships in the paper,
the preponderance of research to date suggests that both information sharing and investments in
relation-specific assets lead to improved economic performance. Natural] y, if trust faci Iitates
both, then trust would have an important, though indirect, effect on the joint economic
performance of exchange partners.
RESULTS
The simple descriptive statistics for the pooled sample and each country are shown in
Table 1. The descriptive statistics indicate that supplier trust is significantly higher in Japan than
in Korea or the United States, which have similar levels of supplier trust. The findings also
indicate lower variance in trust in Japan when compared to the U.S. or Korea (see standard
deviations reported in Table 1). The findings from this industrial secto~ support previous
arguments that trust among Japanese transactors is high trust relative to the U.S. (Dore, 1983;
~ Of course, we only have data for this industry so we cannot say definitively that trust levels in the U.S.
as a society are lower than in Japan.
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Sake, 199 1; Shane, 1994) and contradict Fukayama’s ( 1995) claims that Japan and the United
States have similar levels of trust. The descriptive statistics also indicate that Japanese suppliers
share more confidential information and have slightly lol~er transaction costs when compared to
their U.S. ‘and Korean counterparts. Supplier in~estments in relation-specific assets \vere found
to be highest in Korea. followed by Japan, and the United States. This is not surprising since
some studies have found that 72 percent of Korean automotive suppliers supply to only one
customer (Oh, 1995). Automaker assistance to suppliers was reported to be highest in .lapan and
Korea, with U.S. automakers offering significantly less assistance to suppliers.
[Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here]
The simple bivariate correlation presented in the correlation matrix in Table 2 represents
only the direct relationships between each pair of variables. Therefore, the structural equations
model, which separates direct and indirect effects will yield somewhat different results. The
results of the LISREL model employed to test our hypotheses are shown in Table 3. The overail
fit of the model can be measured by several different indicators. They are chi-squared statistic,
root mean squared residual (RMR), goodness-of-fit index (GFI), and adjusted goodness-of-tit
index (AGFI). For our model, we have a chi-squared statistic of 118.79 (p-value 0.000); RiilR of
O.12; GFI of 0.92; and AGFI of 0.69. Therefore, the overall fit of the model is good. The chi-
squared statistic is not particularly good, but this statistic is often adversely affected by a large
sample size. Our sample size of 453 is large enough to affect this statistic. On the other hand. all
other measures of fit are good, with GFI of 0,92 being very good.
First, our data indicate that greater supplier trust in the buyer leads to lower transaction
costs for the exchange partners. These relationships are significant in the pooled sample, the
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United States, and Korea. However, while the sign is in the expected direction, the relationship
is not significant in Japan, perhaps in part due to the low variance in trust among Japanese
transactors. Overall. hypothesis 1 is strongIy supported. Second, our analysis suggests a positive
relationship bet~veen supplier trust and the sharing of valuable and confidential \vork-related
information by the supplier. Hypothesis 2 is strongly supported in the pooled sample. Japan.
and Korea (p<.O I ) and weakly supported in the U.S. (p<. 10). Third. our results do not support
hypothesis 3, which proposed that greater trust leads to more investments in relation-specific
assets. Our data indicate essentially no relationship bet}veen trust and investments in relation-
specific assets. Fourth, we found, as expected, an inverse relationship between information
sharing and transaction costs. However. while the sign ~vas in the expected direction in each
country the absolute value of the t-value is rather small. Thus, we do not find strong support for
hypothesis 4. Fifth, consistent \vith transaction cost theory. our data indicate a positive
relationship between investments in relation-speciilc assets and transaction costs in the pooled
sample, Japan, and Korea. However this relationship was only statistically significant in Japan
and in the United States there was a negative relationship between these variables. Therefore.
hypothesis 5 receives mixed support. Finally, our results indicate a significant, positive
relationship between supplier information sharing and buyer technical assistance in the pooled
sample as well as in each country. Thus, hypothesis 6 receives strong support.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
DISCUSSION
Our study is one of the first large-sample empirical tests of its kind to demonstrate an
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inverse relationship between trust and transaction costs in supplier-buyer relations. To further
explore the relationship between trust and transaction costs, as well as the extent to which trust
may create substantive economic value in exchange relationships, we examined the impact of
supplier trust on the transaction costs incurred by each automaker. First, we examined the
percentage of the supplier-automaker’s face-to-face interaction time spent on transaction-oriented
activities such as negotiating a contract (ex ante contracting) or assigning blame for problems in
the course of transacting (ex post haggling). We plot this percentage in Figure 2 along with each
automaker’s mean score for supplier trust on the three trust submeasures (in Figures 2 & 3. U.S.
automakers are identified as A 1, A2. A3; Japanese automakers as J 1. J2: and Korean automakers
as KI, K2, K3). The correlation between supplier trust (mean score for all suppliers for each
automaker) and transaction costs for this small sample was 0.82. The findings show that the
most trusted automakers, A3 and J 1. spent only about 21 percent of their face-to-face interaction
time negotiating contracts/prices (ex ante contracting) and assigning blame for problems (ex post
haggling). By comparison. firm A 1 spent 47 percent of its face-to-face interaction time on non-
productive, transaction-oriented activities. Thus. A 1 and its suppliers spent more than twice as
much as their face-to-face interaction time on ex ante contracting and ex post haggling compared
to J 1 and A3 and their suppliers. While these differences may not be fully attributed to trusting
relations between the firms, the fact that the most “trustworthy” automakers were 50 percent
more productive in their face-to-face interactions with suppliers when compared to the
automaker with the least supplier trust is certainly non-trivial.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
To further confirm the link between trust. low transaction costs, and economic
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performance, we obtained another measure of each automaker’s transaction costs (or the
productivity/efficiency of each automaker’s procurement function) based on more objective data.
Each automaker’s procurement (transaction) costs i~as operationalized as the total number of
individuals employed in procurement for production parts (including management. purchasing
agents/buyers, lawyers, and support staff) divided by the total value of goods they procured.
This is expressed as the dollar value of goods (parts) purchased per procurement employee. We
believe this is a reasonably accurate measure of the relative procurement (transaction) costs
incurred by each automaker because the procurement staff is: a) completely responsible for
searching for new suppliers, b) completely responsible for contracting with suppliers, c)
primarily responsible for gathering information from the other operational units to create an
overall evaluation (monitoring) of performance. and d) primarily responsible for enforcing
performance. Thus, we believe our measure is a reasonable proxy for the relative transaction
costs incurred by automakers. We found that this measure was highly correlated \vith our
previous measure of transaction costs as demonstrated by a pearson’s correlation of 0.61. When
we plot this measure for each automaker, along with supplier trust, we come up with similar
findings--though perhaps the differences are even more dramatic (See Figure 3). The correlation
between supplier trust and automaker procurement productivity for this sample was 0.66. The
findings indicate that firm A 1, which had low supplier trust, incurred procurement (transaction j
costs which were more than twice those of the other U.S. firms, A2 and A3, and almost six times
higher than firm J 1. Interestingly, at least one Korean firm had relatively high producti~ ity on
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this measure even though it had not cultivated high levels of trust with its suppliers.~ This
indicates that there are undoubtedly a number of factors that influence our measure of
procurement productivity (costs), but clearly supplier trust seems to be one of the important
factors. Our tindings indicate that trust. as a governance structure. cannot be ignored in
discussions regarding the factors that influence transaction costs and economic performance.
Moreover, these findings suggest that in some industry settings the economic value created
through trusting interfirm relationships may be considerable.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
We also found that consistent with transaction cost theory there \vas a positi~e, though
weakly significant, relationship bettveen supplier investments in relation-specific assets and
transaction costs. However. it is worth noting that trust was a more important predictor of
transaction costs than were the supplier’s relation-specific investments. Thus. although exchange
partners may expect transaction costs to increase with investments in relation-specific assets.
they may be able to keep transaction costs low if they are able to develop high levels of interfirm
trust. Trust may be a key factor which enables exchange partners to enjoy the benefits associated
with relation-specific investments while keeping transaction costs relatively low.
Additionally, in accordance with our predictions we found that trust was positively
associated with information sharing. This finding was echoed in interviews with supplier
executives who claimed that they were much more likely to bring new product designs and new
; Of course, a number of factors will influence procurement productivity. Some anecdotal evidence
suggests that the general productivity of a Korean white-co llarworker is typically quite high if only because
they typically work longer hours than their American, and even Japanese, counterparts.
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technologies to “trustworthy” automakers. Stated one supplier executive,
We are much more likely to bring a new product design to [Automaker A3] than to
[Automaker A 1]. The reason is simple. [Automaker A 1] has been Icnowmto take our
proprietary blueprints and send them to our competitors to see if they can make the part at
lower cost. They claim they are simply t~ing to maintain competiti~e bidding. But
because we can’t trust them to treat us fairly. \ve don’t take our new designs to them. We
take them to [Automaker A3 ] where \ve have a more secure long term future,
Thus. trust facilitates the sharing of relevant task-related information, particularly information
that may be viewed as proprietary by the supplier. This is particularly important because the
supplier’s new designs and innovations may be critical in helping the buyer to differentiate its
product in the marketplace.
Contrary to our predictions. we did not find a positive relationship between trust and
relation-specific assets. One interpretation of these findings is, of course. that transactors are
simply not more likely to make greater relation-specific investments in trading partners simply
because they have developed high trust relations. Trust may not be a strong enough safeguard to
protect suppliers’ relation-specific investments which clearly are subject to opportunistic
exploitation. However, it is also possible that the suppliers in our sample who had not made
significant investments in relation-specific assets simply had less at risk. \vere less vulnerable,
and therefore reported relatively high levels of trust in the automaker. In effect. due to a lack of
vulnerability, there was no reason for the supplier not to trust the automaker. There is some
question as to whether this is really “trust” since vulnerability is a key prerequisite for trust.
Another possible explanation for this finding is that suppliers may be forced to make
investments in relation-specific assets due to technological necessity, but they may do so
reluctantly or they may rely on other governance mechanisms (other than trust) to protect those
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investments. For example, stock ownership may act as a substitute for trust, particularly in Japan
and Korea where automakers are known to take stock ownership positions in key suppliers.
Similarly, in the relatively low trust U.S. institutional environment. suppliers may have relied on
legal contracts rather than trust to protect their investments. Thus. stock ownership or legal
contracts may have been used as substitutes for trust. Therefore, technological necessity maj
have forced suppliers to make investments in relation-specific assets even when they had not
developed a high level of trust in the automaker. Under these conditions. the suppliers ~~ould
have been forced to rely on other substitute governance mechanisms (e.g., stock ownership, legal
contracts, etc. ) to protect their investments.
The Distinctiveness of Trust as a Governance Mechanism
“ In the process of examining the economic outcomes of trust, we discovered an interesting
phenomenon that may explain why trust is particularly valuable as a governance mechanism.
This finding emerged as we attempted to determine whether information sharing and buyer
assistance were antecedents or outcomes of trust. For example, does information sharing lead to
trust, or does trust lead to information sharing? Of course, the answer is both--trust and
information sharing are subject to mutual causality and each variable is therefore both an
antecedent and. an outcome of the other. Furtherrncre. supplier investments in information
sharing and buyer investments in offering technical assistance not only build trust. but also
simultaneously create economic value in their own right. To confirm this we ran a regression
model to test the relationship between our previous dependent variables (information sharing,
transaction costs, relation-specific investments, buyer assistance) and supplier trust (as a
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dependent variable). We found significant positive relationships between information sharing
and supplier trust (T value=4.O; p<.001 ) and buyer assistance and supplier trust (T value=5. 1;
p<.001 ). The other variables were found to be insignificant. Thus. trust leads to certain value-
creating behaviors (i.e. information sharing) and these value creating behaviors in turn lead to
higher levels of trust.
This phenomenon makes trust unique as a governance mechanism because the
investments that trading partners make to build trust often simultaneously create economic value
(beyond minimizing transaction costs) in the exchange relationship. Trust is thus distinct from
other governance mechanisms identified in the transaction cost literature (e.g., contracts,
financial hostages) for which the investment in the gotemance mechanism is viewed as a
necessary COS1to be incurred by the transactors to prevent opportunistic behavior (Williamson.
1985). According to transaction cost theory. the relative attractiveness of each governance
mechanisrrdsafeguard is based on its differential ability to lower transaction costs. Indeed, the
theory’s focus is almost completely on cost minimizing rather than value creation. By
comparison, trust is a unique governance mechanism because it not only minimizes transaction
costs, but also has a mutually causal relationship with other behaviors (i.e. information sharing,
technical assistance) that create value in the exchange relationship. This uniqueness may explain
why trust has been described as a key factor. and the primary governance mechanism, in most
studies of high-performing dyads/networks (Lorenz, 1988; Powell, 1990; Sake, 1992;
Nishiguchi, 1994; Dyer, 1996 b).
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CONCLUSION
This study empirically validates previous theoretical arguments and anecdotal data \vhich
has suggested that trust creates value in economic exchange relationships (Sake, 1991: Barney &
Hansen, 1995; Fukuyama. 1995). In particular. our findings indicate that trust reduces
transaction costs and increases information sharing (\\hich in turn increases buyer technical
assistance) in supplier-buyer relationships. Moreover, the economic \’alue created for
transactors, in terms of lower transaction co~ts, appears to be substantial in the automotive
industry. Thus, trust in supplier-buyer relations may be an importance source of competitive
advantage in industrial settings in which: ( 1) there is a high value associated \vith information
sharing (information is a particularly vaIuable resource due to product complexity and industry
uncertainty) and (2) transaction costs are expected to be high due to conditions that create
transactional difficulties (e.g., environmental uncertainty and high interfirm asset specificity).
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TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations: Pooled Sample and By Country
Variables Pooled us Japan Korea
(n=453) (n=135) (n=lOl) (n=217)
1. TRUST 14.11
(3.26)
2. TRANSCOST .31
(.13)
3. lNFOSHARE 4.82
(1.54)
4. SPEC.ASSET 0.83
(.48)
5. ASSISTANCE 6.74
(2.46) ‘
13.63
(2.64)
0.31
(.}2)
3.58
().73)
0.66
(.26)
5.95
(1.62)
16.37
(2.60)
0.29
(.11)
5.74
(1.09)
0.70
(.32)
6.82
(2.57)
13.35
(3.36)
0.31
(.15)
493
(1.34)
~99
(.58)
Note:
1. Standard deviations reported in parentheses.
.
TABLE 2
CORRELATION MATRIX
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
1. Trust 1.0
2. Transaction costs -.18 1.0
3. Information sharing .31 -!05 1.0
4. Speciilc assets -.05 .06 .11 1.0
5. Buyer Assistance .28 .07 .24 .39 1.0
TABLE 3
LISREL RESULTS POOLED SAMPLE AND BY COUNTRY
—
Relationship Expected Sign Parameter Standard Error T-Value Significance
HI: Trust +Transaction Cost -0.18 0.05 -3.74 ***
UnitedStates: -0.45 0.08 -5.82 ***
Japan: -0.08 0.10 -0.8I
Korea: -0.12 0.07 -1.70 **
H2: Trust +Information Sharing + 0.31 0.04 6.83 ***
UnitedStates: 0.11 0.09 [,’)g
Japan: (),23 0.10 2.37 ***
Korea: 0.23 0,07 3.40 ***
H3: Trust +Relation Spec. Assets + -0.05 0.05 -0.98
UnitedStates: 0.05 0.09 0.59
Japan: 0.10 0.10 I.00
Korea: 0.03 0.07 0.4I
H4: Information Sharing 0.00 0.05 0.04
+Transaction Cost
United States: -0.04 0.08 -0.46
Japan: -0.07 0.10 -0.67
Korea: -0.0I 0.07 -0.07
H5: Relation Spec. Assets + 0,05 0.05 1.18
+Transaction Cost
United States: -0.03 0.08 -(),56
Japan: t3,~3 0.10 2,33 ***
Korea: 0.06 0.07 0,89
H6: Information Sharing + 0.24 ().05 5.34 ***
+ Buyer Assistance
United States: 0.15 0.09 I.79 **
Japan: 0.19 0.10 ].g~ **
Korea: 0.18 0.07 ~jfJ ***
Goodness of tit for the pooled data model.
**significant at ~ = 0.05; ***significant al a = 0.01
Chi-squared statistic with 4 degrees of freedom= 118.79 (P = 0.00)
Root mean square residual (RMR) = 0.12
Goodness - of- fit index (GFI) = 0.92
Adjusted Goodness - of- fit index (AGF1) = 0.69
RMR = 0.08; GFI = 0.93; AGFl = 0.82
FIGURE 1
MODEL OF HOW TRUST CREATES ECONOMIC
VALUE IN EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS
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